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The purpose of this article is to provide an historical overview of the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) academic reform, with a particular 
focus on the empirical basis for the decisions made. The authors outline four eras 
of academic reform, examine the types of information the NCAA has collected 
and used to make decisions about academic policy, and explore the limits of such 
academic data.
We have been conducting research on issues related to the academic success of 
student-athletes for the better part of two decades, and it is a pleasure for us to 
be able to share some of what we have learned here. We want to be clear that the 
data and findings that will be presented in this paper represent the hard work of 
lots of people other than just the authors, and we want to specifically acknowledge 
Ursula Walsh, Tom Paskus, Steve Boker, James Jackson, and the other members 
of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Data Analysis Research 
Network, and all our colleagues on the NCAA research staff for their significant 
contributions to this work.
We would also like to acknowledge all of the committed individuals who 
generously give their time and talent to sit on NCAA committees and wrestle with 
these difficult questions. Academic policy issues within the NCAA are complex and 
controversial. Everyone associated with intercollegiate athletics has an opinion on 
these issues, and the decisions made by these committees come under intense scru-
tiny. While none of us will agree with every decision that is made by these groups, 
the motives of the people who serve are beyond question. Committee members 
study reams of data and engage in sometimes-tortured discussions, but they work 
incredibly hard to get to the best possible solution for all Division I schools and 
students. It can be easy to second-guess their decisions from afar, but the people who 
sit in those rooms understand that the decisions they make affect real people in real 
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ways. That can be a difficult burden, but we have been truly impressed by the way 
that NCAA committee members have responded to the challenge over the years.
In this paper, we provide a brief history of academic research at the NCAA 
and explain how data have been used to inform policy. We will look at the types of 
information the NCAA has collected and used to make decisions about academic 
policy, and we will look at the limits of such academic data. At the end of this paper, 
it is our hope that you have an appreciation for the complexity of the issues related 
to academic success of student-athletes and a better understanding of exactly how 
the NCAA has tried to use data to address those issues.
For purposes of this paper, we have divided the history of NCAA academic 
research into four “eras.” We will certainly focus our attention on the last two 
eras—essentially the last 20 years. However, we want to provide a little bit of the 
history to shed some light on how we got to where we are today. The eras we have 
identified are not equal in scope of time, nor are they equal in the level of research 
activity, as you will see.
The genesis of NCAA academic research is, to a great extent, wrapped around 
the question of freshman (or initial) eligibility, as is the case with many elements 
of NCAA policy. Dr. Michael Oriard (2012) provides an excellent summary of the 
history of freshmen eligibility in his paper, so we will not rehash that here, but the 
freshman question certainly has driven much of our academic research, especially 
in the early years.
The first era of academic research that we have identified runs from the begin-
ning of the NCAA in 1906 until about 1980. This might actually be best described 
as the prehistory of NCAA academic research. During that time, there was little-
to-no research regarding student-athlete academic performance—at least from a 
national perspective. There was some research done surrounding the 1.6 minimum 
GPA (grade point average) rule in the 1960s, but most of that work was at the 
institutional or conference level. It is fair to say that, to this point, the NCAA did 
not use research in a systematic way.
The second era in NCAA academic research comprises the 1980s. In that 
decade, there were significant changes in the eligibility rules made by the Associa-
tion (e.g., Proposition 48), but, in the words of the NCAA’s Director of Research 
at the time, Ursula Walsh, the policy was “remarkably free of empirical research.” 
There were two primary catalyzing factors that led to the development and impo-
sition of Proposition 48. The first was a series of high-profile academic scandals 
within intercollegiate athletics, including the identification of a few high-level 
student-athletes who had attended multiple years of college but were functionally 
illiterate. The second was a national movement to improve higher education as a 
whole that was exemplified by the influential governmental report titled “A Nation 
at Risk” (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983). That report 
was released the same year Proposition 48 was passed, and that is probably not 
coincidental. Proposition 48 was sponsored as NCAA legislation by the American 
Council on Education—a group that was intimately involved with the larger reform 
efforts occurring within the higher education community.
Thus, Proposition 48 was adopted within a climate of national educational 
reform and with substantial support from the membership, but there was not any 
specific research undergirding the legislation. Significant questions arose on the floor 
of the 1983 NCAA Convention, at which Proposition 48 was adopted, about how 
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the legislation would impact low-income and minority students. These questions 
persisted even after the adoption of the legislation, and at that time there were no 
data available to provide empirical answers. In response, the NCAA membership 
created a special committee to study the issues, and that committee recommended 
that the NCAA undertake a longitudinal study to better understand the impacts of the 
new academic regulations. That became the NCAA Academic Performance Study 
(APS) and was the NCAA’s first real effort to collect data from its member schools 
on these issues. Data from that study served as the backbone for the inquiries that 
were undertaken in the third era of NCAA academic research.
In the 1980s, in the midst of the discussions related to Proposition 48, Ron 
Smith and Jay Helman (1987) wrote an excellent paper on the history of the 
freshman-eligibility question. In that paper, they identified three sources of ten-
sion that drove historical policy decisions related to the issue: academic integrity, 
competitive equity, and financial considerations. In simple terms, the argument was 
that at times and in places where academic integrity was the primary consideration, 
freshmen would be ineligible for athletics competition. Conversely, when financial 
issues were driving policy decisions, freshmen would be eligible to compete because 
schools would be able to field competitive teams less expensively by being able 
to include freshmen on their rosters. Competitive-equity concerns have been used 
to argue this issue from both sides, generally depending on the size of the school 
making the argument.
These considerations continue to be germane to any discussion of NCAA 
academic policy; however, a fourth very important consideration has been added 
to the mix in current discussions of these issues: educational access for low-income 
and minority populations. Because of large differences in secondary education in 
this country, these rules do not affect all populations of prospective student-athletes 
in the same way. One can argue athletics is the route to a college education for 
many students from disadvantaged backgrounds and that restricting those students’ 
access to an athletics scholarship essentially closes the door to a college education 
for them. Since the late 1980s, the issue of access has been at the forefront of any 
discussion of NCAA initial eligibility regulations.
It was about 1990 when the NCAA had collected sufficient academic data 
to begin to conduct its own analyses of impacts of academic policies on student-
athletes. This ushered in what we have identified as the third era of academic 
research, and we will concentrate the rest of this paper on our work in this era. 
Issues studied during this time included high school academic performance and 
initial eligibility, college academic performance and continuing eligibility, and the 
best ways to measure team-level academic success. During this era, we also came 
to understand certain limits of how data can inform and shape policy. For instance, 
we made the important separation between objective indices and subjective deci-
sions. Specifically, we found that there was much data that could be informative on 
specific issues (e.g., that high school grades and test scores were useful predictors 
of college success), but there were limits to the data and points where decisions 
would have to be made by group consensus (e.g., exactly where to set cut-scores 
on eligibility rules).
Before discussing specifics about findings from our research over the past 
two decades, it is important to provide some general background about the data 
on which many of these findings are based. The majority of results from the third 
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era of academic research come from data collected in the APS. In that study, the 
NCAA collected both high school and college academic data in a longitudinal 
manner from over 10,000 Division I student-athletes across five cohorts (from 
1984 to 1988). Thus, data were collected from two cohorts of student-athletes who 
entered college before Proposition 48 was implemented and from three cohorts 
postimplementation. In 1994, the NCAA began certifying the eligibility of all 
incoming-freshmen student-athletes. And while the driving force behind this effort 
was related to compliance and equity concerns, this was a huge boon for our aca-
demic research. The Initial Eligibility Clearinghouse (IEC), as it came to be known, 
collected complete high school academic records from over 100,000 prospective 
student-athletes each year. (The IEC has since been transformed into the NCAA 
Eligibility Center, or NEC, but the data collection remains a very important part of 
our research efforts.) Between 1994 and 2002, the NCAA collected college-level 
data on Division I student-athletes on a voluntary basis through the Academic Per-
formance Census (APC). In that collection, data were gathered on between 10,000 
and 20,000 student-athletes per year. With the implementation of the Academic 
Performance Program (APP) in 2003, Division I institutions were required to 
submit academic data on all of their scholarship student-athletes. The Association 
now receives college-level academic data from over 100,000 student-athletes per 
year, and by matching data from the NEC to the APP, the NCAA is able to create 
complete longitudinal academic records on Division I student-athletes from the 
time they are in high school until they exit the Division I institutions. These data 
are the best we are aware of in higher education regarding the complete academic 
trajectories of a national sample of high school and college students (for more 
information on NCAA data, see Petr & Paskus, 2009).
We will now describe a few specific results from the third era of academic 
research at the NCAA. A first set of findings has to do with our ability to predict 
college success. Over the course of the past two decades, we have run many models 
attempting to predict college academic success from precollege variables. Through 
most, if not all, of these models, a few findings stand out:
•	 High	 school	 grades	 are	 better	 predictors	 of	 success	 than	 standardized	 test	
scores. In most of our models, grades are 2–3 times more predictive than test 
scores.
•	 A	combination	of	grades	and	tests	is	a	better	predictor	than	either	of	the	two	
variables used in isolation. The incremental benefit of including test scores in 
a prediction model is generally small, but meaningful.
•	 Using	a	core-curriculum	grade	point	average	(GPA)	provides	better	prediction	
than using the overall high school GPA. We have noted that our prediction 
accuracy has improved as we have increased the number of courses included 
in the core-curriculum requirement.
•	 Demographic	 variables,	 such	 as	 income	 and	 race/ethnicity,	 are	 important	
attributes to consider in the models but are generally accounted for once tests 
and grades are included in the model.
•	 Different	demographic	groups	have	different	distributions	of	scores	within	the	
variables of use (e.g., test scores and grades), so the imposition of almost any 
rule will lead to differential impacts on various subgroups. Generally speaking, 
African American and low-income students are more likely to be impacted 
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by	any	rules	that	use	grades	and/or	tests	as	criteria.	However,	this	is	due	to	
distributional differences in those variables as opposed to differences in the 
actual predictive validity of the measurements.
These results have led NCAA committees to attempt to craft rules that use 
tests and grades in conjunction with each other and to weight grades equally or 
slightly higher than test scores. In addition, the impacts on different subgroups are 
always studied and efforts are made to minimize adverse impacts without harming 
the integrity of academic policy.
A second result that has been consistent over time is that use of a single cut-
score on standardized tests is not advisable. While this continues to be a very con-
troversial topic and passionate arguments continue to be made for the reimposition 
of a standardized test cut-score in NCAA initial eligibility legislation, we would 
argue that this is one issue on which the national data are quite clear. There is a 
consistent set of factors that have led NCAA policy makers to avoid the use of such 
a cut-score in NCAA academic regulations over the last decade. These include:
•	 Psychometric	experts	at	 the	 testing	companies	are	 in	agreement	 that	using	
test scores as a single factor in high-stakes decisions is an inappropriate use 
of standardized tests. The testing agencies have been on public record against 
using a single cut-score on the tests since Proposition 48 was adopted in 1983.
•	 As	used	in	Proposition	48	and	Proposition	16,	the	test	cut-score	led	to	tests	
being overweighted by a 2-to-1 margin as compared with high school GPA. 
As stated above, this weighting runs counter to our prediction models, which 
indicate grades should be weighted equal to or higher than tests.
•	 Regulations	that	overweight	the	test	score	tend	to	decrease	overall	accuracy	of	
our predictions and lead to increases in adverse impact within certain demo-
graphic subgroups.
•	 Use	of	a	single	cut-score	can	lead	to	differential	initial	eligibility	decisions	for	
student-athletes with the same predicted chance of success.
•	 There	is	evidence	that	use	of	a	cut-score	simply	changes	student	testing	behav-
ior, but does not necessarily make for better-prepared student-athletes.
We would like to turn now to a bit of the evidentiary data that underlie some 
of the conclusions mentioned above. To begin with, we provide some informa-
tion on the actual academic outcomes of student-athletes with various incoming 
academic profiles.
In Figure 1, we have presented data on freshman-year academic outcomes 
of various groups of student-athletes based on incoming high school grades and 
test scores. The y axis represents core-curriculum grades in high school, and the x 
axis represents standardized test scores (in SAT units). The diagonal line that runs 
through this chart indicates the sliding scale that is currently in use as the mini-
mum for initial eligibility for Division I student-athletes in conjunction with a 2.0 
high-school-core GPA (HSCGPA) minimum. Those student-athletes represented 
by the Low-Test highlighted area in the upper left of this figure are student-athletes 
who have fairly high GPAs, but relatively low test scores. The student-athletes in 
this group were declared ineligible under both Propositions 48 and 16 because of 
the 820 test score-cut, but have become eligible under the sliding scale that was 
implemented in 2003. We compare those in this group to those in the Low-HSCGPA 
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group represented in the lower right area of this chart, who have relatively high test 
scores, but lower GPAs than most other student-athletes. This group has been fully 
eligible under all recent NCAA initial eligibility regulations. Illustrated in the figure, 
members of the newly eligible group represented in the upper left of the figure 
are out performing those in the Low-HSCGPA group in most measured areas of 
freshman academic performance, including freshman GPA, eligibility rate, retention 
rate, and number of academic failures (labeled here as “0-for-2” student-athletes). 
It is also important to note that student-athletes represented in the Low-Test area 
are much more likely to be minority student-athletes than those who have always 
been eligible in the Low-HSCGPA area. We have been conducting similar analy-
ses for over a decade, and the findings shown here from the 2009–2010 freshmen 
have been consistent from before the 2003 changes in the initial eligibility rules, 
on through the most recent data available.
It is, of course, possible that the freshman-year academic differences observed 
in the previous figure would not maintain through a college career. Thus, we can 
also look at longer term academic outcomes for these groups of student-athletes.
In Figure 2, data for the 2003–2004 entering freshmen class related to 5-year 
academic outcomes are presented. When comparing the newly eligible Low-Test 
group (see Figure 2, upper left) to the Low-HSCGPA group (lower right), we see 
similar results to those observed in the freshman-year outcomes. Specifically, the 
newly eligible student-athletes show a higher proportion of graduates (by between 
8 and 9%), and a lower proportion of academic failures (by between 7 and 8%). 
These data make it clear that any rule that excludes the group represented in the 
Low-Test area but includes those represented in the Low-HSCGPA area is very 
difficult to defend. This consistent finding over time has played a very strong 
Figure 1 — First-Year Academic Performance of Low-Test vs. Low-GPA Qualifiers in 
Division I (2009-10 Division I Freshmen)
NCAA Academic Research and Reform  33
role in committee decisions to remove the cut-score on the standardized tests and 
move to a full sliding-scale approach that combines test scores and grades in initial 
eligibility regulations.
Figure 3 provides interesting information on the observed impacts on test-
taking behavior of student-athletes when faced with a cut-score on a standardized 
test and the ability to take the test as many times as necessary to achieve a quali-
fying score—as was the case in both Proposition 48 and Proposition 16. The top 
graph in Figure 3 shows the distribution of test scores among prospective student-
athletes in 2002, the final year of the use of an absolute cut-score in NCAA initial 
eligibility legislation. Instead of a smooth curve that is normally distributed, we 
see a “cliff” in the distribution that appears just above the cut-score minimum of 
820 on the SAT. The next three graphs in the figure show the 3 subsequent years 
(after the cut-score was removed), and we observe a significant smoothing of the 
distribution and the cliff that had been evident in the top graph essentially disap-
pears. This provides evidence that student-athletes under a rule, which included 
a cut on the test score, simply took the test enough times to artificially raise their 
scores to a point that was above the minimum score. When considering the majority 
of student-athletes who were below the cut on their initial attempt were within 50 
points of the minimum score, such leveraging of subsequent test-taking opportuni-
ties seems very possible. There is no evidence, however, that achieving a minimum 
standard through repeated testing led to student-athletes who were better prepared 
for college academic coursework.
Before we leave this important topic, we want to highlight one finding from 
our most recent graduation success rate (GSR) data that is related to these issues. 
The changes in initial eligibility standards that were implemented in 2003 had 
Figure 2 — Five-Year Academic Performance of Low-Test vs. Low-GPA Qualifiers in 
Division I (2003-04 Division I Freshmen)
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two goals: to maximize academic success and to minimize adverse impact on 
low-income and minority student-athletes. Data from the recent GSR indicate that 
these goals are being met.
Specifically, as Figure 4 shows, the proportion of minority student-athletes in 
the GSR cohort (represented by the upper line in the chart) and the proportion of 
minority graduates (represented by the lower line) dropped after the imposition of 
Proposition 16 in 1995. Those numbers stayed at post-Proposition 16 levels until 
the new eligibility rules went into effect in 2003, removing the cut-score on the 
test. In that 2003 cohort, we saw large increases in both the proportion of African 
Americans in the overall GSR cohort and among graduates. These trends contin-
ued with the 2004 cohort. These increases in minority representation come at the 
same time we have seen strong positive change in GSRs within all sport groups, 
indicating that overall academic performance is up, as well as the representation 
and academic success of minority student-athletes.
In a third overall finding from era three, we noted that the high school and col-
lege the student-athletes attend matter because these institutions are not all the same. 
This may seem fairly obvious, but it is an important and nontrivial consideration. In 
Figure 3 — Best SAT score among PSAs on a Division I IRL in  2002 (Prop 16) vs. 2003-
2005 (Sliding Scale)
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evaluating our statistical models, it was clear taking into account characteristics of 
the colleges student-athletes would attend could enhance our predictions of success. 
However, any potential rule providing differential access to the pool of recruits for 
different colleges was deemed unacceptable due to competitive equity concerns. 
Because of that practical reality, it is important to remember NCAA standards are 
national minimums that must account for student profiles and institutional missions 
at over 300 very diverse institutions. Because of this wide disparity in institutional 
missions and philosophies within Division I, these rules are in no way meant to 
substitute for institutional admissions policies or for thoughtful review of student-
athlete admissions on each and every member campus.
A fourth important result from this era of academic research is that our 
predictions of academic success are better if the measurements of the predictor 
variables are closer in time to the academic outcome of interest. When we first 
began modeling predictions of academic success, we put a lot of emphasis on the 
prediction of college graduation from high school academic variables. However, 
models predicting graduation were much less accurate than those that predicted 
freshman academic success using high school variables. As we looked further 
into these models, it became clear that, while high school grades and test scores 
were the best predictors of freshman academic outcomes, first-year college out-
comes are much better predictors of eventual graduation. These findings led to 
what became known as the “seamless” model of eligibility regulations, where 
freshman-eligibility rules are based on high school academic variables, but the 
progress-toward-degree (PTD) standards are based on in-college academic profiles 
of eventual graduates.
We want to say a bit more about the development of the current PTD standards. 
While there had been continuing eligibility standards in place through the 1980s 
Figure 4 — Proportion of African-American Student-Athletes Among GSR Cohort and 
GSR Graduates 1995-2003
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and 1990s, those standards were set at levels that seemed to have minimal impact 
on student-athlete academic performance. These regulations were modified in 2003 
and include minimum percent-of-degree regulations (e.g., the 40–60–80 advance-
ment standards) and minimum continuing GPA standards for student-athletes 
as they progress through their collegiate academic careers. In developing these 
standards, our research in this area focused on the in-college academic trajectories 
of successful student-athletes. Specifically, rules for both percentage of degree 
earned and year-by-year GPA minimums were based on the observed distributions 
of all student-athlete graduates and were set at the fifth to 10th percentile of those 
distributions. Thus, the rules were set at levels that approximately 95% of actual 
graduates were attaining on a year-by-year basis. However, far fewer nongraduates 
were performing at these levels under the old rules. The goal here was to create 
policy that would require all student-athletes to be put on an academic trajectory 
that would be more likely to lead to graduation.
It is interesting to note that differential behaviors between graduates and non-
graduates are evident very early in college and continue throughout enrollment. 
Figure 5 shows average credits earned for the nongraduates (as shown in group on 
left) versus the graduates (on the right) on a year-by-year basis. As you can see, 
the nongraduates earn significantly fewer credits beginning in the freshman year 
and moving through every year thereafter in their college careers. The goal of the 
new PTD legislation is to move student-athletes who would have been in the group 
represented on the left in the figure into an academic profile that puts them in the 
distribution of scores seen in the group on the right.
As another example of the thinking behind the setting of specific PTD stan-
dards, Figure 6 shows estimated impacts of various second-year GPA regulations. 
As with the initial eligibility standards, the goal with the PTD regulations is to 
Figure 5 — Academic Year Credit Hours for Graduates vs. Non-Graduates Persisting Four 
or More Years
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maximize academic success, while minimizing inaccuracies and, especially, adverse 
impacts. The chart on the left of Figure 6 illustrates the level of accuracy we have 
with various selections in terms of predicting eventual academic success by using 
cumulative GPA at the end of the second year as a selection mechanism. As you 
can see, moving from no rule to a minimum 1.9 GPA increases the accuracy of our 
selections. However, in the groups studied here, there is no noticeable increase in 
accuracy beyond the 1.9-GPA level. Conversely, the chart on the right shows the 
false negative rates for various levels of GPA. Obviously, the goal of any rule should 
be to minimize the rate of false negatives. In this chart, we see that the rate of false 
negatives for all subgroups is very similar through the 1.9-GPA level. However, we 
begin to see significant separation of those rates among minority student-athletes 
as we move to the 2.0 level. It was the combination of no measurable increases in 
accuracy with this noticeable shift in false negatives among minority student-athletes 
that caused the NCAA membership to set the second-year GPA rule at a minimum 
of 1.9. Similar analyses were used to assess all potential GPA and percent-of-degree 
eligibility rules for all 4 (or 5) years of collegiate enrollment.
The final set of findings we will highlight from this era of academic research 
has to do with the overall academic performance of student-athletes and observed 
impacts of NCAA academic legislation. Specifically, what we observed through-
out our data analyses in the 1990s was that student-athletes, on average, tended to 
behave academically in a fashion that was very similar to the overall student body 
and that changes in NCAA academic rules corresponded with positive changes 
in student-athlete academic success. In another finding, the graduation rates of 
Division I student-athletes have been slightly higher than those of their nonathlete 
peers. This finding is more noticeable when we compare student-athletes to similar 
demographic subgroups within the overall student population.
Figure 6 — Projected Impacts for Varying GPA (0 to 2.0) and 48 Credit-Hour Requirements 
in Second Year(Based on Data from 2000 NCAA Graduation Cohort)
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Figure 7 illustrates the trajectory of student-athlete and student body federal 
graduation rates (FGR) over the 21-year period for which we have been collecting 
these rates. As is seen in the graph, since the implementation of Proposition 48, 
student-athlete graduation rates have tended to be 1–3 percentage points above 
those for the general student body in Division I across this entire period of time. It 
is also evident that the largest single-year increases for student-athletes correspond 
with changes in NCAA eligibility standards that occurred in 1986 (imposition of 
Proposition 48), 1995 (increase in number of core courses), and 1996 (use of sliding 
scale as imposed by Proposition 16). There is evidence in both GSR and FGR data 
that recent academic changes will also lead to improved academic performance 
among student-athletes.
Table 1 illustrates differences between student-athletes and the general student 
body within various demographic subgroups on the FGR. There are two points to 
highlight in this table. First, while the overall student-athlete rate is two percentage 
points higher than the student-body rate, some of the demographic subgroups show 
significantly greater differences. For instance, White female student-athletes are 6 
percentage points higher than White females in the general student body. Among 
African-American student-athletes, males are 12 percentage points higher than 
their student-body counterparts, and females are a full 20 percentage points higher 
as a group than African-American females in the student body. Only White male 
student-athletes trail their student body demographic counterparts. Second, though, 
are the clear differences in gender and ethnic subgroups within the student-athlete 
population. We continue to be concerned with graduation rates of some of these 
groups–particularly African-American males. There is good news in that the rate 
for that group of student-athletes is higher than it has ever been–and is up 17 per-
centage points from when the graduation rates data were first collected. However, 
the disparity between that group and other student-athletes is still of concern. As a 
Figure 7 — Federal Graduation Rates of All Student-Athletes versus All Students at Divi-
sion I Institutions
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brief aside, the 38% FGR for African-American males in the nonathlete population 
should be of enormous concern to all who play a role in higher education.
The comparative graduation-rate findings reported above all use the FGR as 
the unit of measurement. This rate continues to be the only rate for which there is 
a direct comparison between the student body and the student-athlete populations. 
However, our membership has long believed that the FGR is an inadequate measure-
ment of student success (for both athletes and nonathletes). For this reason, we were 
asked to develop a different measure of academic success that more accurately takes 
into account the variety of pathways that student-athletes might take to eventual 
graduation. This became the Graduation Success Rate (GSR).
The GSR was developed with several goals in mind. First, we wanted to get 
closer to a true student-centered graduation metric, as opposed to the institution-
centered FGR. The GSR was designed to deal with transfer students (both into and 
out of our institutions) in a much more realistic way than the federal rate. By includ-
ing transfers, the GSR begins with a cohort that is 35–40% larger than that defined 
in the FGR. It is important to note that the GSR is not a statistical manipulation 
of graduation data—it is simply a change in the cohort definition that we believe 
is more reflective of current educational realities. The calculation remains based 
on known academic outcomes of student-athletes within each potential graduation 
cohort. On average, GSRs tend to be between 15 and 20% higher than federal rates 
with current GSRs for the overall student-athlete cohort of about 80%.
As a check on the validity of the GSR as a measurement of academic success, 
we used the student-centered data collected in our Study of Collegiate Outcomes 
and Recent Experiences (SCORE) study of former student-athletes. In that study, 
we were able to track the long-term academic outcomes of a group of almost 10,000 
former Division I student-athletes who had entered college approximately 10 years 
earlier. The SCORE data indicated that just over 60% of them graduated from their 
initial college within 6 years of enrollment, almost identical to federal graduation 
rates for the same cohorts. However, an additional 25% of these former student-
athletes indicated that they had graduated from an institution that was different 
Table 1 Comparison of Federal Graduation Rates Between 
Student-Athletes and Student Body For Select Groups in 2004 
Entering Class
Student-Athlete 
Group
Student-Athlete  
Graduation Rate
Student Body  
Graduation Rate
Overall 65% 63%
White 68% 66%
African-American 55% 44%
White Males 62% 63%
African-American 
Males
50% 38%
White Females 74% 68%
African-American 
Females
66% 46%
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than the one in which they had initially enrolled. This puts our best estimate of the 
real, long-term graduation rate among Division I student-athletes at between 85 
and 90%, much closer to the GSR estimates of success than the FGR.
As we moved in the early 2000s from the third era of academic research into 
the fourth, there were two findings that we want to highlight because they played 
an important role in driving much of our recent work and somewhat changed our 
approach in both research and policy. The paper in this issue by Tom Paskus (2012) 
will discuss all of the work in that era in detail.
The first focus of the recent research grows from the finding that, while high 
school academic characteristics are fairly good predictors of freshman performance, 
they are not nearly as good at predicting graduation from college. This finding led 
to a significant change in the thinking of the NCAA about academic issues. The 
Association moved from what had been a considerable focus on freshman eligibil-
ity as the primary policy initiative for student-athlete academic success to a much 
broader look at academic policy. There was a realization that member colleges can 
only have minimal impact on what happens to student-athletes before they come to 
our institutions, so the NCAA should look much more closely at what happens to 
those student-athletes while they are on our campuses. Thus, the question becomes: 
How	can	we	 create	 policies,	 incentives,	 and	best	 practices	 that	 inspire	 (and/or	
require) all NCAA constituent groups to place a primary focus on the academic 
success of student-athletes during their collegiate careers?
The second area of focus stems from our observations of fairly significant sub-
group differences in academic performance. There are large observed differences 
by	race/ethnicity,	by	sport	group,	by	gender,	and	by	many	other	characteristics.	
Some of these differences were fairly explainable by understanding differences in 
incoming academic characteristics among various constituent groups, but some 
were not. Thus, another driving goal of the fourth era of research was to better 
understand those differences and try to address them.
In his paper, Dr. Paskus (2012) will discuss some of the ways we’ve tried to 
deal with these and other issues.
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